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Abstract This article investigates the European Union’s (EU) relevance to the
Turkish-Cypriot (TC) administration, pegged to the Europeanization debate. The
study contributes to the discussion on Europeanization and the EU’s international
role, especially in cases of contested states, which constitute an important element
of the EU’s current global agenda but remain an under-researched topic. The argument
advanced is that the Europeanization of the TC administration, although similar to
previous cases of EU Enlargement, is importantly mediated by the conditions of con-
tested statehood that exist in northern Cyprus. In this respect, the TC example holds
strong comparative value for the study of Europeanization of contested states and the
wider debate on international role of the EU, in variety of contexts and in relation to a
diverse range of actors, beyond conventional states that dominate discourse.
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Introduction
In May 2004, Cyprus acceded to the European Union (EU) as a divided
country. The failure of reuniﬁcation of the Greek-Cypriot (GC) and Turkish-
Cypriot (TC) communities under a common state before EU accession created
the conditions for a particularly complex enlargement case: Cyprus entered the
EU as a whole island but in the administrative face of the GC-controlled
Republic of Cyprus (RoC), in the southern part of the country. The northern
side, home to the TCs and their secessionist and self-declared state of Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), are considered by the EU as a territory
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upon which the internationally recognized government of the RoC cannot
exercise control and is, therefore, exempted from the application of EU law
(Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty). To address this sui generis situation, the
EU has sought to assist the TCs in order to (i) prepare for the full application
of the EU law also in northern Cyprus, in the event of a GC–TC reuniﬁcation
under a new state and (ii) boost their socio-economic development and
integration with the EU. This activity has been an avenue for an extensive EU
impact on the TC part, and especially the institutional scene of the contested
state. The article investigates this EU effect on the TC institutional scene
(particularly the executive, legislative branch, central and local government), as
a test-case for the relevance of the EU to contested states. Focus here is mostly
on the period since 2006, which marked the beginning of intensive EU–TC
relations.1 The EU impact is assessed based on the two main Regulations that
are at the epicenter of the EU endeavor.
The examination of the EU effect on TC institutions is conceptually linked to
the Europeanization literature, which seeks to explain the process via which the
EU impacts the domestic scene of associated states (EU member, candidate or
third states). With Europeanization discussion being primarily concerned with
examples of states, TCs represent a distinctive case of a contested state. Here, we
approach ‘contested state’ as the entity that has control over a territory and has
unilaterally declared state independence, which, however, has not been diplo-
matically recognized by the international world (see also Papadimitriou and
Petrov, 2012). Those features are reﬂected in the case of the secessionist TRNC,
which retains effective control of northern Cyprus and was self-declared in
1983, but remains unrecognized by the international community, including the
EU (United Nations Security Council, 1983). Another important characteristic
of the TC case, which directly relates to the contested statehood status, is the
international isolation (in economic, political, social and more general terms)
that TCs are subjected to (only Turkey maintains diplomatic relations with the
contested TC state). It is posited that these features of contested statehood
mediate the process of Europeanization of domestic affairs: they pose signiﬁ-
cant challenges to Brussels’ role on the ground but they also create more room
for an extended EU impact on certain domestic aspects and especially institu-
tional matters. Although a small number of Europeanization studies have
discussed topics relevant to contested states (not least the related conﬂicts or the
ofﬁcial states from which the entities seeks secession), the EU’s impact on their
exclusive domestic arena is neglected. However, this is a very important topic
for understanding the international role of the EU, which increasingly engages
in regions that host contested entities, such as Kosovo, the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As
a result, the TC case provides substantial contribution to the discussion on
Europeanization and increased comparative relevance to other examples of
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contested statehood. More broadly, the investigation of the TC case offers
signiﬁcant insights for the stimuli and limitations of the EU to affect its external
environment, in a plethora of contexts and with reference to a variety of actors,
beyond conventional states that monopolize narration.
In this regard, research methodology is based on a single case study, pegged
to the debate on Europeanization. A review of the existing literature provides
the conceptual framework for the following investigation of the TC example,
which is based on qualitative analysis of primary material, including policy
discourse and especially ofﬁcial documents from the EU and local level.
Research also draws on a wide range of interviews with a representative sample
of members of the European Commission and various local elites and civil
society that take part in the interaction with the EU.
Following an introduction of the conceptual framework of Europeanization,
the third section of the article looks at the EU-induced impact on the TC
institutional scene. Here, after a brief overview of the TC institutional setting,
research is structured on the two main EU Regulations (‘Financial Aid
Regulation’ and ‘Green Line Regulation’) concerning northern Cyprus and
the institutional alternations that they have triggered. Empirical ﬁndings are,
then, conceptually revisited in the fourth part. The ﬁnal section summarizes the
article and discusses its comparative value.
Europeanization: A ‘Fashionable’ and ‘Useful’ Term
Europeanization constitutes one of the most debated and debatable analytical
tools of contemporary European politics. As such, Europeanization has already
been deployed in broad reference to contested states, but scholars have mostly
focused on the EU’s impact on the conﬂict related to each case (for example,
Emerson, 2003; Coppieters et al, 2004; Tocci and Kovziridze, 2004; Vahl and
Emerson, 2004; Williams, 2004; Nodia, 2004; Tocci, 2008; Secrieru, 2011). In
addition, a limited number of works have looked at how domestic actors of
certain contested states understand the EU (for example, Vahl and Emerson,
2004; Popescu, 2007) or the EU’s efforts for state-building, especially in Kosovo
(for example, Bieber, 2011; Bo¨rzel, 2011). As far as Cyprus is concerned,
Europeanization studies have explored either the EU’s aptitude for conﬂict
resolution (for example, Zervakis, 2002; Tocci and Kovziridze, 2004) or the
inﬂuence of the EU on the domestic arena of the internationally recognized
RoC, which dominated efforts for accession into the EU (for example,
Featherstone, 2000; Stefanou, 2005; Sepos, 2008).
In contrast, this work seeks to satisfy the need for a comprehensive account
of the EU’s impact on the exclusive TC zone, placing institutional arrangements
at the spotlight. This is a very signiﬁcant aspect of Europeanization, which has
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not attracted academic attention. As a result, this work does not only shed light
on the neglected impact of the EU on the TC side, but it also has comparative
value for understanding the EU’s relevance to contested states. This study of
contested statehood offers important insight into the debate on the EU’s ability
to project an international role in a variety of pretexts and with regard to
a diverse set of third actors, including contested entities that nowadays seat at
the heart of the EU’s international agenda. It is posited that conditions of
contested statehood, despite limiting the EU’s overall ﬂexibility, actually foster
idiomatic and strong Europeanization pressures at the domestic level. In this
regard, we debate Europeanization as the process via which the EU impacts
national level, and, more speciﬁcally, domestic politics, policy and polity
(Ladrech, 1994; Bo¨rzel, 1999; Wallace, 2000; Hix and Goetz, 2001; Buller and
Gamble, 2002; To¨ller, 2010).
Central to the debate on Europeanization and also the effort to explain the
TC example are the mechanisms through which the EU effect is channeled in
the domestic arena, which can be broadly categorized into:
(a) Europeanization by institutional compliance, which refers to the EU impact
via the provision of speciﬁc institutional models that countries need to
adopt (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002).
(b) Change of domestic opportunity structures, whereby change occurs as
a result of redistribution of power among domestic actors. For example,
redistribution might enable certain actors to better achieve their goals
(Schmidt, 2008, p. 302) or ‘exit’ domestic constraints and pursue their
interests through European structures. At the same time, the EU has the
potential to provide various ‘informational advantages’, which relate to the
inﬂuence that players enjoy due to their relevance to or knowledge of
a particular matter, or, more opportunities for greater access to information
via their participation in the EU affairs (Hix and Goetz, 2001, p. 12).
(c) Framing of domestic beliefs and expectations, what we schematically call
‘cognitive Europeanization’, which relates to changes in the styles, practises
and ‘ways of doing things’ (Radaelli, 2000, p. 4) of domestic players. Indeed,
cognitive change can be widely conceptualized as inﬂuences related to ‘softer’
channels of Europeanization, such as processes of socialization of actors into
certain practices (Schmidt, 2001, p. 12; Bo¨rzel and Risse, 2002; Pasquier, 2005).
In reference to domestic remits upon which Europeanization is ‘projected’,
those can be divided into polity, politics and policy. With regard to domestic
polity, which relates more to the institutional focus of this research on the TC
administration, scholars have concentrated on the executive (for example,
Bulmer and Burch, 2000; Goetz, 2000; George, 2001), the legislature (for
example, Goetz and Meyer-Sahling, 2008) or local administration (for example,
Burch and Gomez, 2003; Fargion et al, 2006). A reoccurring research theme
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is also the EU effect on power constellations between different domestic
institutions: some have argued for the weakening of the legislative branch (for
example, Goetz and Meyer-Sahling, 2008) to ﬁnd opposition by those who see
national parliaments as a winner of EU integration (for example, Goetz and
Meyer-Sahling, 2008). The same goes with local authorities, where a diversity of
opinions has been expressed about the EU’s positive, negative or differentiated
effect upon them (for example, Radaelli, 2000, p. 11).
‘Exporting’ Europeanization
The external relations of the EU have raised series of research questions about
the ‘Europeanization’ of countries beyond the Union’s borders. A range of
scholars have debated Europeanization in third countries (for example,
Wallace, 2000, p. 371; Buller and Gamble, 2002, p. 10; Lavenex and Ucarer,
2004, p. 419; Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 8) but EU Enlargement remains
a particularly strong branch of the literature, which has sought to investigate
how the process of accession has impacted candidates for EU membership.
Although there is increased analytical focus on accession conditionality
(for example, Smith, 1998; Grabbe, 2001; Vachudova, 2003; Glenn, 2004), the
occurrence of Europeanization is better conceptualized in reference to the
overall process of preparing for EU integration via development, which is much
broader in terms of scope and also participation of local agents. In this regard,
although the TC case does not perfectly ﬁt into any of the categories of EU
relations presented so far (member states, candidates or third states), Brussels’
approach toward the TCs is strikingly similar to Enlargement strategy: the EU
embarks on assistance of a third party (TCs) toward development and
approximation with the EU law in anticipation of its implementation via full
EU integration (see also below). It is, therefore, the Enlargement-led Europea-
nization literature that becomes most helpful in explaining the TC example.
The mechanisms introduced for the study of Europeanization of EU member
states go a long way toward investigating the TC case and, indeed, Enlarge-
ment-led EU impact in general. In this regard, the accession process is less
relevant to institutional compliance pressures (Mechanism A, see above), given
that the EU guidance toward the institutional arrangements needed for acces-
sion has been rather vague (Grabbe, 2001, p. 1023). In contrast, Enlargement-
framed institutional and other domestic changes can be better understood as
products of ‘cognitive Europeanization’ and, more speciﬁcally, ‘normative’
changes (candidate countries are communicated institutional or policy styles
through interaction with the EU) or ‘mimetic’ pressures, whereby countries
‘learn’ about successful policies and institutions from other candidates
or existing EU members (for example, Sedelmeier, 2011, p. 10). Finally, EU
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accession has often provoked the change of domestic opportunity structures
and created certain ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore,
2004, p. 622). Indeed, the latter two mechanisms are expected to prevail over
institutional compliance pressures in the TC example too.
Polity, politics and policy of the candidate states can be generally regarded as
the domestic remits upon which Europeanization is reﬂected. Regarding polity,
which is at the focus of this work on the TC administration, changes have
stemmed from the need of candidate countries to develop institutions to match
the interaction with the EU and implement the EU acquis communautaire. As
far as institutional structures to manage EU affairs are concerned, many (for
example, Agh, 1999; Grabbe, 2001; Lippert et al, 2001; Fink-Hafner, 2005;
Goetz, 2005) posit that the main impact of EU Enlargement has been the
strengthening of the executive vis-a`-vis the legislative branch and the local
authorities and the emergence of a ‘core executive’, a small governmental team
to handle dealings with the EU (for example, Lippert et al, 2001). So far,
research on the EU effect at the local level has produced diverse results, which
propose either the empowerment or marginalization of regional players (for
example, Grabbe, 2001; Czernielewska et al, 2004; O’Dwyer, 2006).
Finally, the Enlargement-related EU impact on domestic matters has been
importantly facilitated by the credibility of conditionality (that is, clear promise
of EU membership strictly conditioned on the criteria of accession – see
Sedelmeier, 2011), whereas both technical and ﬁnancial assistance have helped
candidates to meet the criteria set (O’Dwyer, 2006, p. 225). Besides, the expe-
rience of EU Enlargement is also very relevant to the so-called ‘goodness of ﬁt’
thesis (Radaelli, 2000; Cowles et al, 2001; Featherstone and Radaellli, 2003),
which refers to the degree of compatibility between EU and national policies,
processes, institutions and structures and the effect of this relation on the course
and outcome of Europeanization; the majority of scholars suggest that the
bigger the ‘misﬁt’ the greater the EU impact is, whereas Bo¨rzel and Risse (2002)
draw particular attention to ‘policy’ and ‘institutional’ mismatches. For example,
during the enlargement 2004/2007 round, ‘Europeanization’ was particularly
aided by the important gap between EU conditionality content and the policies
and polity that existed at the domestic level of the post-communist states. This
relative prematurity is indicative of the aptitude of EU Enlargement to induce
change in environments where there is both space and need for reform. Indeed,
the notable underdevelopment of the TC contested and isolated state creates
expectations for important institutional and policy ‘misﬁts’ to mediate the
process of Europeanization.
Along these lines, Europeanization is not only ‘fashionable’ but also ‘useful’
(Olsen, 2002) in analyzing the EU effect on the TC domestic arena. In an effort
to explain the importance of contested statehood, the main focus of this
research is polity and public institutions (as the domestic aspect that is most
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associated to the contested administration), and it is against this background
that mechanisms of Europeanization are tested. Furthermore, although idio-
matic as a case, Brussels’ strategy toward the TCs is very similar to enlargement
policy, which is based on the ﬁnancial and technical assistance of a third party
(TCs) toward future integration and application of the EU law. Correspond-
ingly, the EU relevance to the TC institutions is expected to largely reﬂect
Enlargement record and the related literature is particularly important in
‘unpacking’ this Europeanization on the TC case. As the TC preparation for
implementation of EU law is still at an early stage, this research does not focus
on the institutional result of the application of acquis but, instead, on the
institutions developed to manage interaction with Brussels and the prepara-
tions for integration into the EU. Consequently, research begins with the
hypothesis that the EU has impacted the TC institutional scene by (i) triggering
the emergence of an institutional structure to deal with EU integration,
(ii) a following (re)distribution of power between TC institutions and (iii) the
communication of new institutional and policy styles and practises. In trying to
contribute to the discussion on Europeanization, increased attention is paid
to the mediating factor of contested statehood and how this shapes the degree
and nature of the EU effect on domestic matters.
A ‘Pending Accession’?: EU and the TC Administration
The TC administration and institutional mosaic have been profoundly shaped
by the history of Cyprus and its inter-communal conﬂict. The difﬁculty of the
two communities to cooperate under the RoC, the bi-communal state estab-
lished in 1960, led to the gradual division of the island, which was reinforced
by the 1974 war. Since then, the country has been divided in two different
territorial and administrative zones: in the south, the RoC, now monopolized
by the GCs but still recognized as the only legal administration of Cyprus, and
the TC community, retired in the north, and under the administrative face of
the self-declared TRNC, which, until this day, heavily relies on Turkey and
remains internationally unrecognized and isolated. As a result, the administra-
tion in northern Cyprus has been mainly informed by the experience of TCs
during British rule before independence, the very few years of bi-communal
cooperation under RoC or Turkey’s help to establish a separate administration
in more recent years. As a consequence, policies and structures informed by the
colonial era of Cyprus but also Turkey (Interview, European Commission
ofﬁcial A0, Brussels, 2009), and outdated administrative systems (Interview,
Head of EUCC, Nicosia, 2009) are central characteristics of the internationally
isolated TC community and evident of an important gap between the domestic
and the international (including EU) level. Naturally, isolation has also resulted
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in very low familiarization of the elites involved in the TC institutions with
international processes and practises.
Nonetheless, the TC administration displays some typical characteristics of
a stable separate institutional and political space. The political system of the
self-proclaimed TRNC is set along the lines of a semi-Presidential democratic
republic. The directly elected president is the head of state and shares the
executive power with the council of ministers (Article 5), head of which is the
prime minister (PM). The presidential post has increased importance within
TC politics due to (i) the bold personality of Rauf Denktas¸, who monopolize
and shaped the position for over 20 years (1983–2005) and (ii) the chief
role of the president in all the reuniﬁcation talks with the GCs until now. The
legislative power rests with the TC unicameral parliament of 50 seats (Article 4),
while the supreme court (Article 6) sits at the top of the TC judicial institu-
tions. Locally, the TC administration is comprised of three levels. At the
top, ﬁve districts (Nicosia, Famagusta, Kyrenia, Morphou and Trikomo)
are headed by an Ofﬁcer. At the second level, mayors and councils preside
over municipalities, and at the third and ﬁnal level the villages are admini-
strated by commissions. Local authorities appear to enjoy a certain degree
of independence, which indicates a reasonably balanced system of power
between central and regional governance. This institutional landscape was
meant to be importantly impacted by the TC–EU relations, which intensiﬁed
around 2006.
The ‘Financial Aid Regulation’
Before circa 2006, substantial links between Brussels and the TCs did not exist.
This is a consequence of the TC absence from the overall process of EU
accession of Cyprus, which was monopolized by the GC-led RoC. A reluctant
and indirect EU involvement in the TC community started around 2000, when
EU-supported bi-communal projects began, in the frame of pre-accession
assistance. However, the administration of the programs by the United Nations
(UN) limited the EU’s links to the TCs, especially as far as institutions are
concerned.2 Along these lines, the EU activities for the TCs represent a reaction
to the accession of Cyprus as a separated island and have been based on two
Regulations: the ‘Green Line Regulation’ (The Council of the EU, 2005), which
controls the movement of goods and persons between the TC and GC areas (see
also below), and the ‘Financial Aid Regulation’ (The Council of the EU, 2006),
which aims at the TC assistance and preparation for application of the EU law,
in the event of a future reuniﬁcation. In addition, a proposal for a ‘Direct Trade
Regulation’ to facilitate trade between TCs and EU member states (European
Commission, 2004a) is still pending, largely due to the veto of the RoC. Here, it
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should be underlined that the EU refers to northern Cyprus as ‘the TC
community’ or – in local terms – ‘areas of the RoC in which the government of
the RoC does not exercise effective control’ (for example, The Council of the
EU, 2006) and is particularly careful to explain that continues to not recognize
the self-declared state:
nothing in this Regulation (i.e. Financial Aid Regulation) is intended to
imply recognition of any public authority in the areas other than the
Government of the RoC. (The Council of the EU, 2006)
At present, the Financial Aid Regulation constitutes the most important EU
instrument in northern Cyprus. As such, it is also the program that sees the
greatest engagement from the side of the TC institutions. The interaction
between the EU and the TC administration mainly relates to the Regulation’s
objectives that aim at:
K the promotion of social and economic development [y]
K the development and restructuring of infrastructure [y]
K preparation of legal texts aligned with the acquis communautaire for the
purpose of these being immediately applicable upon the entry into force of
a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem (The Council of the EU,
2006).
These priorities are indicative of the similarities between the EU strategy
deployed in the TC case and the approaches followed in other examples of EU
Enlargement: despite the largely different context of relations, the EU objective
here is the aid of a partner (TCs) toward approximation with the EU law in
anticipation of its application. It is therefore not surprising that the process of
Europeanization in the TC community resembles other Enlargement cases (see
also below). However, what is interesting to note (and test against other
Europeanization cases) is the lack of conditionality credibility: in the TC case
neither the ‘stick’ nor the ‘carrot’ of EU accession is as strong: EU integration is
linked to reuniﬁcation, which is nothing but sure (therefore, the ‘promise’ of
integration is not as clear) and also something that the EU cannot effectively
control, in case TCs do not undertake certain reforms (therefore, ‘criteria’ of
EU integration are not relevant, as the EU cannot suspend or award integration
anytime).
Faced with EU integration, the TCs had to develop institutional structures,
which deal with the main imperative of EU activities: the management of
assistance and the gradual preparation for implementation of EU law. Brussels’
guidance for the required institutional changes to manage EU affairs was very
abstract (European Commission, 2007) and the TCs resorted to inspiration and
advice from states with previous experience in establishing similar institutions.
In particular, the TC institutional arrangements were informed by two speciﬁc
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cases: Turkey and the RoC itself. TCs ﬁrst consulted the political elites in
Ankara, which are regular contacts of the contested administration (Interview,
Head of EUCC, Nicosia, 2009). At the same time, TCs were also inspired by the
GC institutional changes in the frame of the EU accession process of Cyprus (as
handled by the GC-led RoC), some years earlier. Indeed, the good relations
between TC and GC political elites played an important role in gaining advice
on the appropriate TC institutional setting for the interaction with the EU
(Interview, Head of the EUCC, 2010).
Along these lines, pressures of institutional compliance (see above, Mechan-
ism A) have not been exerted upon the TCs, given that the EU did not provide
guidance for explicit institutional changes. Instead, EU-induced alterations are
better understood as a ‘cognitive’ type of Europeanization (Mechanism C),
which takes place through strong ‘mimetic pressures’: TCs have learned how to
respond to European integration from consultation with other, more experi-
enced parts (for example, RoC, Turkey) and have ‘mimed’ their institutional
styles and solutions introduced. Indeed, the below analysis of TC structures is
suggestive of outstanding similarities to institutional solutions of other EU
membership candidates. In fact, these reforms based on ‘cognitive’ processes
and not so much institutional compliance have been extensively discussed in the
literature of Enlargement-led Europeanization.
The collective TC institutions developed for the management of EU affairs
are divided into three levels (Figure 1). The Monitoring andManagement Com-




Members: Undersecretary of PM, Ministers
of Foreign Affairs & Finance, State Planning
Organisation, EUCC Head
CHANGE & MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
ON FOOD SAFETY, VETERINARY &
FYTOSANITARY
Chair: Minister of Agriculture
Members: EUCC Task Manager, Department
Director(s), EUCC Head
WORKING GROUP ON FOOD SAFETY
Chair: EUCC Task Manager and Director of
Food Safety Department
Members: Technical Personnel from
Ministries and Stakeholders
WORKING GROUP ON VETERINARY
Chair: EUCC Task Manager and Director of
Veterinary Department
Members: Technical Personnel from
Ministries and Stakeholders
WORKING GROUP ON FYTOSANITARY
Chair: EUCC Task Manager and Director of
Fytosanitary Department
Members: Technical Personnel from
Ministries and Stakeholders
Figure 1: TC institutions for the management of EU affairs.
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for the monitoring and management of the process of harmonization with EU
law (EUCC, 2010). For the most part of this research, the MM Committee was
chaired by the ‘Special Representative’, a type of ‘EU Minister’ (see below).
After the change of government in April 2009, the chairmanship of the MM
Committee was delegated to the minister of transport, who was very familiar
with EU affairs (EUCC, 2010). Other members of the MM Committee include:
the undersecretaries of (i) the PM, (ii) the foreign affairs minister, (iii) ﬁnance
minister and (iv) state planning organization (a ministerial unit concerned with
development matters) and the head of the EU Coordination Center (EUCC, see
also below). The MM Committee is accountable to the council of ministers,
whereas the TC president enjoys great (largely informal but effective) inﬂuence
over the process of harmonization (Interview, Head of EUCC, Nicosia, 2010).
At the second level, the so-called Change Management Committees (CM
Committees) are based on the speciﬁc chapters of EU law to be prepared for/
adopted and they are responsible for the harmonization strategy. This level too
sees increased participation of ministerial authorities: each CM Committee is
consisted of the relevant EUCC Task Manager, ministry department direc-
tor(s), minister or undersecretary plus the head of the EUCC (EUCC, 2010).
Finally, the last level of the institutional pyramid includes Working Groups,
which bring together technical personnel from the ministries and the EUCC,
and a good number of civil society representatives and stakeholders.
This institutional setting is indicative of the extensive involvement of
governmental actors in the process of European integration, which provides
them with increased leverage over certain policies (for example, reforms in the
frame of European integration) but also a series of other privileges, including
access to the EU environment and resources or ‘informational advantages’.
This EU-induced change of opportunity structures in favor of a ‘core executive’
that manages EU matters is indeed a reoccurring theme of the Enlargement-
focused Europeanization literature.
Among the aforementioned actors, the EUCC, as a new, purpose-build
institution, is a particularly revealing aspect of the EU’s domestic impact. The
EUCC coordinates, organizes and monitors the relations between TCs and the
EU and plays a crucial role in the entire Financial Aid Regulation. Employing
a small team of contractual experts and ministerial staff, the EUCC has been
exclusively headed by a young technocrat, who has a strong EU background
and is not directly afﬁliated to any party or government. This head of the
EUCC shares power with a series of ministers in the MM Committee and also
nominates the members of the CM Committees and Working Groups. This
collection of duties gives EUCC a very important job within the interaction
with the EU and a clear presence in all three levels of the institutional pyramid.
As a result of inﬂuences by the GC institutional structures, the EUCC has, to
a large degree, the same responsibilities with the ofﬁce developed in the RoC,
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for the purpose of EU accession (Sepos, 2008, p. 375; Ofﬁce of the Coordinator
for Harmonisation, 2010).
The interesting ﬁnding here is the way the proﬁle and, most importantly,
power of the EUCC have been mediated by the conditions of contested
statehood. The EUCC is largely accountable to the presidential ofﬁce which,
therefore, secures a dominant position in the process of EU integration. Despite
that, the EUCC has maintained a certain degree of distance from the TC
authorities. This is largely due to the diplomatic stance of the EU itself, which
tends to refer to the EUCC as an actor distinct from the ‘TRNC’ bodies
(Interview, European Commission Ofﬁcial B0, Nicosia, 2009), in order to avoid
‘recognition by implication’, a term often used to refer to the recognition/
legitimization of the TC authorities from the side of the EU, through the direct
interaction of the latter with the former. Indeed, the government of the RoC
has been particularly instrumental in opposing EU engagement with the TC
administration, based on the argument that this creates diplomatic recognition
consequences. Correspondingly, a central reason for the establishment of
the EUCC was the facilitation of the EU’s interaction with an actor free of
references to the self-declared TC state (Interview, KTTOMember B0, Nicosia,
2009; EUCC, 2010). As a result, this greater participation of the EUCC in
European affairs becomes a source of varied beneﬁts: more inﬂuence in decision
making (for example, in the process of preparing for EU integration), greater
access to the EU environment and more prestige, information, resources and
opportunities at both the domestic and international level (through the
participation in the activities of the EU and interaction with EU elites). Besides,
the international isolation of the contested state and the very limited knowledge
of EU affairs results in ‘informational advantages’ for those few elites with EU
expertise (such as the head of the EUCC). Looking back at the conceptual
framework of Europeanization, it seems that EU integration has generally
empowered the executive branch but opportunity structures are uniquely
affected by the variable of contested statehood and produce an important
empowerment of the EUCC.
The Europeanization via change of domestic opportunity structures (see
Mechanism B) also contributes to explaining the case of the ‘Special Represen-
tative for the EU and the UN’ (hereinafter ‘Special Representative’). For the
most part of this research, the Special Representative post was served by an
elected member of the parliament (MP). Despite the existence of a separate
TC foreign minister, Special Representative also undertook international
representation tasks. This was due to the fact that the EU and UN, the main
responsibility of Special Representative, were also the two major foreign actors
that TCs have ties to. In addition to this diplomatic role, the Special
Representative was also responsible for the supervision of TC efforts for
EU integration as chairman of the MM Committee (Interview, Special
A model of ‘contested’ Europeanization
171r 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790 Comparative European Politics Vol. 12, 2, 160–183
Representative, Nicosia, 2009). Those combined responsibilities are indicative
of an EU-induced empowerment of the Special Representative and important
similarities with institutional solutions already observed in other cases: Special
Representative is very similar to the post of ‘EU minister’ introduced in other
EU integration cases and discussed by the Europeanization literature (for
example, Turkey, Czech Republic, Estonia or Hungary; see Lippert et al, 2001).
At the same time, the identiﬁcation of the leading domestic ﬁgure of EU affairs
with the post of foreign minister is also very common in Enlargement history
(see below).
Here, again, the parameter of contested statehood and the non-recognition
of the TCs by the EU played an important role in the proﬁle and power of
the Special Representative. The position of Special Representative was only
recently created and was also free of any connotations to the self-declared
TRNC that titles such as ‘minister’ bear. Similarly to the case of EUCC, it looks
that Special Representative was approached by the EU as a single actor, not
closely associated to the TC authorities, despite the fact that the ofﬁcial
was practically part of the presidential ofﬁce and the ‘right hand’ of the then
president. From this focal position, Special Representative enjoyed a variety of
advantages that relate to domestic inﬂuence and policymaking (for example,
over the process of harmonization with the EU law) but also to easier access
to international environment and increased policy knowledge, networking
opportunities as well as prestige. Besides, international isolation and unfami-
liarity with EU affairs provided ‘informational advantages’ and favored people
with EU expertise as more appropriate to serve the post of Special Representa-
tive (both the two ﬁrst ofﬁcials that served the post had an important knowl-
edge of international/EU matters). As a result, Special Representative was
a new and, comparatively, powerful player. Again, Europeanization through
change of domestic opportunity structures contributes to the understanding of
the overall reinforcement of a powerful executive (that the Special Representa-
tive as well as the EUCC related to). However, contested statehood mediates
this power equilibrium and offers added inﬂuence to the Special Representative,
as an actor seemingly less correlated to the TC administration.
The group of aforementioned actors (Figure 1) has led the TC efforts for
capacity building and preparations for the implementation of EU law. From
the side of the EU, experts have provided a series of ‘awareness seminars’ on
a wide range of topics, including legal approximation with EU law, training
on the principles of effective transposition of legal texts as well as public
expenditure management (TAIEX, 2009, p. 18). The ‘training’ of the TCs has
also been based on EU missions on the ground or visits of locals to EU member
states for the exchange of best practises (TAIEX, 2004, p. 12; TAIEX, 2005,
p. 10). Although the contested statehood and the absence of recognition of TC
institutions is explicitly cited as counter-productive to the EU’s role in the area
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(TAIEX, 2009, p. 18), the activities are still important and have intensiﬁed in
recent years (TAIEX, 2010, p. 28). An indicative example of this ‘knowledge
transfer’ has been the ‘Regional Training Programme’, which coaches domestic
ofﬁcials on the implementation and enforcement of EU legislation (TAIEX,
2007, p. 20).
The variety of those activities have resulted in the production a TC ‘action
plan’, the so-called ‘Programme for Future Application of Acquis’, which can
be seen as the equivalent of National Programmes for Adopting the Acquis,
consolidated in previous cases of enlargement. The program relates to 13 pri-
oritized policy areas and, so far, particular progress has been recorded in the
areas of environment, agriculture, statistics (TAIEX, 2007, p. 10), ﬁnancial
activities and competition law (TAIEX, 2008, p. 20).
This part of the EU–TC interaction, which has been framed by both EU
and local elites as the most important element of Brussels’ role in the area
(Interview, European Commission Ofﬁcial A0, Brussels, 2009; Interview, KTTO
Member B0, Nicosia, 2009) is particularly important for the ‘Europeanization’
of the TCs. Here, the focus of Brussels is on the ‘understanding’ and trans-
formation of the TC mentality with regard to the adjustment to EU policy and
practises (Interview, KTTO Member A0, Brussels, 2009). As a result, rather
than a coercive adjustment to certain conditions and reforms, the TCs engage in
a process of ‘Europeanization’ through the communication of new ideas and
practises via their socialization into the EU environment (see also Mechanism
C). The extensive exchange of expertise and consultation with EU experts has
a great potential for the ‘cognitive’ Europeanization and EU-informed ‘norma-
tive changes’, through the communication of new styles and practises of policies
and institutional setting. What is more, the international isolation of the
contested state has led to a large gap of policy and institutional arrangements
between the EU and the domestic level, which creates added opportunities for
cognitive pressures to be exerted upon the TCs.
In contrast to the executive, which the above actors belong or are accoun-
table to, the legislative branch and the local authorities display limited
participation in the dealings with the EU. First, the role of the TC parliament
has been restricted to the approval of legislation for the approximation with the
EU law but does not relate to the preparations for the application of acquis and
the rest of EU activities. Second, the participation of regional institutions is
limited to ad hoc committees, which have sought to coordinate different parts of
the TC administration toward the implementation of the EU assistance at local
level, such as the project of water/wastewater management (Interview, Head of
EUCC, Nicosia, 2010). However, the actors coming from the ‘core executive’
team, which is responsible for the interaction with the EU (Figure 1),
remain at the helm of the process. Therefore, although EU integration has
a good potential for the development of TC locality (for example, through the
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increased attention paid to infrastructure development), regional authorities,
for the time being, remain relatively untouched by both the process and the
outcome of EU activities. This is another reconﬁrmed manifestation of the
Enlargement-driven Europeanization, which is often characterized by change of
opportunity structures toward the marginalization of local authorities and the
legislature by the central government (see also below).
The ‘Green Line Regulation’
‘Green Line Regulation’ is another EU activity in northern Cyprus, which aims
to control movement of goods and persons between the two communities and
facilitate their trade (with the economic beneﬁt of the TCS being an additional
target).3 In this case, the involvement of TC public institutions is limited and
so is the discussion of this Regulation in this article. Nevertheless, the
unexpected importance of non-state actors in the Regulation, which stems from
the problematic political context of contested statehood, is an important ﬁnding
that merits further investigation.
The Green Line Regulation did not create the need for further, important
institutional arrangements. All the same, it is the minimal participation of TC
institutions in this EU activity that draws the attention. For the successful
implementation of the Regulation, the TC part needed to undertake a series
of responsibilities, such as monitoring of trade and issue of accompanying
documents for the goods traded. Admittedly (Interview, European Commission
Ofﬁcial C0, Brussels, 2009), under normal conditions (not shaped by contested
statehood matters and the ‘recognition by implication’ issue), these duties
would have been undertaken by a series of ministerial authorities. However,
given the fact that the TC administration is not recognized, the EU preferred
to avoid formal and direct interaction with public institutions.
Instead, the European Commission delegated these tasks to the TC Chamber
of Commerce (K{br{s Tu¨rk Ticaret Odasi – KTTO) (European Commission,
2004b), which has been active in trade issues for a long time and has acclaimed
trade expertise, capacity and status within the community. Therefore, the
KTTO became a very important partner for the Commission in the implemen-
tation of the Regulation.
This replacement of public authorities by non-state actors is a particularly
interesting aspect of the TC case of Europeanization. In an unprecedented
move, the EU chose to bypass domestic public authorities as the main
interlocutors in order to avoid ‘recognition by implication’ (see also before).
Instead, the Commission replaced actors coming from the contested TC
administration with non-state players, most notably the KTTO, which do
not bare any diplomatic risks for the EU. This strategy has very important
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consequences for the EU-triggered change in the domestic opportunity struc-
tures: the role of the KTTO in European integration comes hand-in-hand with
an unpredictably important domestic role and inﬂuence over certain policies
related to the EU’s role in the TC community, including leverage over the
Green Line Regulation but also the Financial Aid Regulation, as an inter-
mediate between Brussels and TC civil society beneﬁciaries of EU aid (Inter-
view, KTTO Member B0, Nicosia, 2009). At the same time, KTTO has also
gripped beneﬁts related to the access to international affairs, such as the
establishment of a very strong lobbying delegation in Brussels. In this regard,
the process of Europeanization and change of domestic opportunity structures
is uniquely affected by the variable of contested statehood and results in an
empowerment of non-state actors, such as the KTTO. This is a particularly
important contribution of the TC case to which we return below.
The Difference of Being Contested: Europeanization and the
TC Administration
The TC ‘Europeanization’ bears resemblance to other EU Enlargement cases
but, at the same time, is also characterized by a series of special features related
to contested statehood. Going back to the conceptual discussion on Europea-
nization and the hypothesis introduced, the EU’s relations to the TCs have
indeed triggered important institutional changes. Interestingly, these changes
have not been a result of institutional compliance, the Europeanization mech-
anism most directly related to institutional alterations. Here, the TC case
mirrors the experience of enlargement, where the absence of speciﬁc institu-
tional directions to manage EU affairs has led countries to initiate own
structures, often similar to other candidates. Along these lines, TCs looked
back at previous or current enlargement cases (for example, RoC, Turkey) and
gained from this experience. Hence, the TC institutional changes can be better
conceptualized as a result of ‘mimetic’ pressures rather than mere institutional
compliance. This process of ‘mimetism’ is evident in the type of TC institutional
alterations, which ‘echo’ previous arrangements in the Central East European
Countries, Turkey or even RoC. The EUCC or the Special Representative are
examples of similar institutions established in other European integration cases.
As a result and in accordance with previous Europeanization-informed
changes, EU–TC relations led to the emergence of a distinctive ‘core executive’
to handle the EU affairs, which largely consists of governmental actors
and some purpose-build institutions, such as the EUCC or the Special
Representative.
These institutional changes also relate to an important EU-induced modiﬁca-
tion of the domestic opportunity structures, which goes a long way toward the
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conﬁrmation of the second part of our hypothesis. Similar to other Europea-
nization studies, the TC executive appears to have been the ‘winner’ of
European integration at the expense of both the legislature and local
authorities. The central position of the executive in the interaction with the
EU has increased its already strong domestic inﬂuence. Such an improvement
of power relates to the authority that actors who participate in the EU
integration process enjoy with regard to decision making and their access to
the EU/international environment and beneﬁts in terms of information,
resources, prestige and, ultimately, inﬂuence. Here, the contested statehood
leads to an interesting twist in our working hypothesis: the international
isolation favors elites with EU understanding, whereas the non-recognition of
the self-declared TRNC gives increased role and opportunities to actors who
bear – or seem to bear – less identiﬁcation to the contested administration. In
this regard, important institutional misﬁts facilitate the process of Europea-
nization here: on the one hand, the misﬁt between existing relatively
decentralized structures and the EU-induced empowerment of a core execu-
tive, and on the other the misﬁt between the previous prevalence of actors
coming from the administration and the novel importance of players that are/
seem to be less identiﬁed to the contested state (for example, EUCC, KKTO –
see also below).
Not only is the executive central to the process of EU integration but also
the role of the TC parliament has been restricted to the approval of legislation
to align TC policies to the EU acquis. As a result, the overall EU effect has
been a reinforcement of the existing tendency toward a rather weak legislature
vis-a`-vis the executive branch. Besides, when it comes to EU matters, the
established (relative) balanced distribution of power between central and
regional government is also challenged: the aforementioned ‘core executive’
has also dominated EU activities related to the TC regional development.
Indeed, as discussed earlier, scholars have extensively debated the weakening
of both the parliament and local authorities as a result of the EU-led
Europeanization process.
Finally, an important ‘cognitive’ EU impact is also evident in the TC case and
reconﬁrms the last part of this work’s hypothesis. First of all, the institutional
changes that have occurred extensively rely on blueprints of arrangements in
other EU integration cases. This is evident of an important EU effect on the
institutional styles favored among TC elites who, through their socialization
into the EU environment, ‘learn’ new ways of institutional setting. In addition,
the several EU activities, which aim at the transfer of ‘know-how’ and the
adoption of different policies and practices toward harmonization with the
EU law and development (for example, TAIEX), unleash a certain amount of
cognitive pressures on the actors that participate. In absence of a coercive
process of ‘Europeanization’, TCs are faced with new approaches of
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institutional and policymaking and might experience a process of ‘framing’ of
‘ways of doing things’, especially at this stage, where the EU efforts concentrate
on understanding, preparation and capacity building for implementation of
the EU law. Nevertheless important, the limited credibility of conditionality
and the absence of criteria for EU integration does potentially limit the
TC incentives toward reform and, therefore, the process of ‘cognitive’
Europeanization.
Two speciﬁcities of the TC case mediate the process of Europeanization and
contribute to the conceptual debate on the EU’s leverage on contested states.
First, the issue of the long-standing TC isolation interplays in a fascinating way
with the ‘goodness of ﬁt’ thesis: the TC isolation has created an important
policy misﬁt between the EU and the TC level, which is mostly characterized by
dated structures and policies. This gap has created the conditions for signiﬁcant
(mainly cognitive) pressures, to be exerted upon the TC institutions and their
actors, through the EU programs and the introduction into novel policies of
conditionality. In addition, the related low familiarity of the TCs with the
international/EU affairs has also affected the domestic power equilibrium and
has provided two types of ‘informational advantages’: ﬁrst, it appears that the
limited EU expertise, which characterizes series of domestic elites, has given
increased role and beneﬁts to players, such as the head of the EUCC or those
serving as heads of the CM Committee, who enjoy an EU background and can
better respond to the relevant policy challenges. Second, the participation of
certain domestic actors in the process of EU integration offers additional
privileges with regard to access to the international environment, which the
isolated community has been missing.
Another fascinating factor that affects the Europeanization process is the
absence of international recognition for the TC administration. On the one
hand, the issue of non-recognition has led to a low intensity role of Brussels in
northern Cyprus. At the same time, the non-recognition of the self-proclaimed
TRNC has uniquely affected institutional arrangements and has given
increased power and opportunities to a group of actors that were recently
established and have been regarded as distinctive from the ofﬁcial unrecog-
nized state, such as the EUCC or the Special Representative. The risk of
‘recognition by implication’, which the dealings with TRNC representatives
entail for Brussels, has also been addressed by the replacement of TC
authorities with non-state actors, such as the KTTO. The case of KTTO is
indicative for the opportunities provided to non-state actors (including
interest groups, civil society and so on) in similar instances.4 This point
represents a uniqueness of the TC example as a contested state, whereby
positions traditionally delegated to public authorities are given to non-state
players, with consequent implications for the advantages that these posts
might provide to their holders.
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Conclusion: Beyond the TC Example
The study of the TC case has been very revealing for the EU’s international
inﬂuence and the discussion on Europeanization. The investigation of the TC
community has reconﬁrmed popular theses of the Europeanization debate,
especially the path of the literature that discusses enlargement. At the same
time, it has provided important knowledge and contribution to the ongoing
conceptual discussion on the EU and its international role and inﬂuence,
especially with regard to the neglected but very important topic of contested
states. The dealings with the EU have informed a series of institutional changes
in the TC administration. Changes here are not a result of institutional
compliance, but, rather, of ‘cognitive’ pressures and inspiration from institu-
tional alterations at other EU integration cases. In addition, an EU cognitive
effect is also channeled via the ‘capacity building’ activity, which aims at
transforming the TC mentality and styles of policy and institutional setting.
This effect seems to gain from the gap that exists between EU and domes-
tic institutional structures and policies, a gap resulted out of years of TC
international isolation. Finally, and in accordance with existing observations of
the Europeanization literature, institutional changes come together with an
impact on the domestic distribution of power and the strengthening of the
executive branch in its already central position vis-a`-vis the parliament and the
local authorities. Nevertheless, here, the balance of power is uniquely affected
by the contested status of the TRNC, which has given increased inﬂuence to
new actors, which bear (for example, KTTO), or seem to bear (for example,
EUCC), fewer correlations to the unrecognized TC state.
Despite restricted to observations with regard to the TC example, this
research aspires to increased relevance to the discussion on Europeanization in
relation to the EU’s external environment and, especially, contested states,
which have been neglected by the literature until now. The study of the TC case
has revealed that under conditions of challenging diplomatic relations, which
are particularly true for contested states, the EU effect on domestic matters
would be normally mediated and ‘slowed down’. It is anticipated that the
solutions devised to bypass those diplomatic challenges will reﬂect the TC case
and the prioritization of actors less (or seemingly less) identiﬁed with the
contested state, which offer interaction that does not lead to recognition claims
and is, therefore, ‘safer’ for the EU to pursue. This is particularly important for
the empowerment of civil society as an alternative interlocutor to state
authorities. Finally, the investigation of the TC example has been illuminative
for an important ‘misﬁt’ between the EU and the domestic level of the contested
(and internationally isolated) partner: based on the TC example, when the
‘Europeanized’ part is considerably behind what EU activities aim at – and this
should be expected to happen in cases of contested and internationally
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‘embargoed’ states – Brussels will need to invest on ‘capacity building’, which
provides increased opportunities for EU effect on domestic matters and
reconﬁrms the popular ‘goodness of ﬁt’ thesis of the Europeanization literature.
The EU, especially after the recent opening toward its ‘near abroad’, is faced
with a diverse series of contested statehood cases, including Kosovo, the
disputed territories in Georgia and Moldova or the occupied Palestinian
territories, to name some of. This foreign agenda is expected to test the EU’s
ability to play a pivotal role in those regions and channel an effect on the
particularly idiomatic domestic setting of these examples. In this context, this
study opens a research dialogue and constitutes an important model for the
study of Europeanization of contested states but the discussion on the EU’s
international inﬂuence will be beneﬁted by more diverse research on the matter.
Particularly welcome is the examination of different contexts of the EU’s
relations to contested entities, for example in the context of enlargement (for
example, Kosovo), the European Neighbourhood Policy (the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territories, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia)
or the better-tailored Eastern Partnership, and how those deﬁne (different) EU
instruments, mechanisms and, ultimately, impact of Europeanization. For the
study of the EU’s relevance to contested states, this investigation of the TC
example has provided a revealing and useful ‘roadmap’.
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Notes
1 For consistency reasons, the research does not go beyond the recent change of TC leadership in
2009/2010 but, instead, focuses on the period under the government of Republican Turkish Party
(CTP) and President Mehmet ali Talat, which, anyway, represent the commencement and most
important period in the EU–TC relations.
2 Before accession, the potential for EU membership led to a strong public pro-European trend,
also translated in the electoral victory of pro-EU political elites vis-a`-vis the Eurosceptic camp.
Although this development does relate to an EU impact on the sociopolitical TC landscape, the
EU bore no substantial relevance to institutional matters, which are at the focus of this work.
3 Reports on the implementation of the Regulation underline limited progress and they make
speciﬁc reference to the matters of contested statehood and the limited recognition of TC
authorities, which create a series of irregularities and negatively affect effective implementation
(European Commission, 2011).
4 The EU relevance to the TC civil society is high and relates to a variety of EU activities, such as
the Financial Aid Regulation or the European Parliament’s activities on the ground, as well as the
wide pro-EU trend that the prospects of EU integration have stipulated (especially in the pre-
accession era). For the sake of coherence, this article only focuses at the importance of the EU for
non-state actors and/ or civil society in the context of the problematic relations between Brussels
and institutions of the contested state and in the frame of the two Regulations at the focus of
investigation.
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